Weekend Roundup

• In the New Republic: Gabriel Rosenberg and Jan Dutkiewicz on the place where the meat industry meets anti-bestiality laws, past and present.

• Catch this virtual event with Ashley Rubin on her forthcoming book, The Deviant Prison: Philadelphia's Eastern State Penitentiary and the Origins of America's Modern Penal System, 1829-1913: Jan.5 at 6-7pm EST. 

• The Wiener Library for the Study of the Nazi Era and the Holocaust, at the Sourasky Central Library, Tel Aviv University, has put some of its collections online, including prosecutions for distributing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the Nazi Justice Collection, which "contains information on the judiciary in Nazi Germany and hundreds of trial transcripts."  N/t: JQB
  

• “The new feature documentary, My Native Air: Charles Evans Hughes and the Adirondacks, co-produced by MDT Publishing and Snarky Aardvark Films, is premiering on-demand in a limited run from January 15th to February 15th, 2021.”  H/t: JQB
  

• Brittany Nichole Adams, Special Collections, Digitization, and Archival Services Librarian, Northwestern University is profiled in the Bright Young Librarians series at FineBooks and Collections.
  

• From the Washington Post's "Made by History" section: Anya Jabour (University of Montana) on why "Referring to female PhDs as ‘Dr.’ promotes equal treatment and values women’s work," including a discussion of trailblazing law reformers (and PhD holders) Sophonisba Breckenridge and Edith Abbott.

• ICYMI:  University of Mississippi fires Garrett Felber, a tenure-track assistant professor in the Arch Dalrymple III Department of History, who has studied the American carceral state. (Mississippi Free Press).  Greg Melleuish on Constitutional History in Australia (Telos Press Podcast).

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.

Campbell on Constitutional Rights Before Realism

Jud Campbell, University of Richmond School of Law, has posted Constitutional Rights Before Realism, which appears in the University of Illinois Law Review 2020: 1433-1454:

Stephen J. Field (LC)

This Essay excavates a forgotten way of thinking about the relationship between state and federal constitutional rights that was prevalent from the Founding through the early twentieth century. Prior to the ascendancy of legal realism, American jurists understood most fundamental rights as a species of general law that applied across jurisdictional lines, regardless of whether these rights were constitutionally enumerated. And like other forms of general law, state and federal courts shared responsibility for interpreting and enforcing these rights. Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment initially disrupt this paradigm in ways that we might expect. Rather than viewing rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment as distinctively “national,” most early interpreters thought that these rights remained a species of general law. For several decades, debates instead focused on the extent to which these rights were enforceable in federal court, akin to the way that federal courts could hear general-law claims in diversity-jurisdiction cases. It was only with the rise of legal realism that American jurists began to conceptualize fundamental rights distinctively in terms of state (constitutional) law and federal (constitutional) law and to divide interpretive authority into state and federal spheres.

–Dan Ernst

Peterson on "Expounding the Constitution"

Farah Peterson, University of Chicago Law School, has posted Expounding the Constitution, which appears in the Yale Law Journal 230 (2020): 2-84:

Judges and statesmen of the early Republic had heated exchanges over the importance of hewing to the text in constitutional interpretation, and they advanced dueling interpretive prescriptions. That is why contemporary theorists of all persuasions can find support for their positions in the Founding era. But no side of the Founders’ debate over constitutional interpretation maps perfectly onto a modern school of thought. Modern scholarship has misunderstood the terms of the Founders’ debate because it sits on an unfamiliar axis. Instead of arguing over whether the Constitution was, for instance, living or static, this Article demonstrates that early American lawyers debated whether the Constitution should be interpreted according to the methodologies applicable to public or private legislation.

This distinction among different types of legislation has faded from view because modern legislatures almost never pass private laws—statutes that apply only to one person, group, or corporation. But in early America, private legislation was the majority of legislatures’ business. Generally applicable laws, like those Congress busies itself with today, were the minority. What’s more, American courts had fixed, predictable, and familiar rules of interpretation for each type of law. Private acts received stricter, more text-orientated interpretations while public acts were interpreted broadly and pragmatically to effectuate their purposes, taking into account new circumstances that the drafters may not have foreseen.

After ratification, critical policy differences emerged among American statesmen in the first Congress. Hamilton and Madison, once united as authors of the Federalist Papers, found themselves on different sides. Both insisted that the Constitution must be interpreted to vindicate their views, and in the process, they opened a debate about interpretation that would characterize the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence until the 1820s. The Federal Constitution was a novelty. But lawyers don’t tend to make new rules to suit new situations; we prefer to rely on precedent. And that is what these lawyers did, using legal tools devised for interpreting legislation—a form of written law with consistent interpretive rules that were part of the bread-and-butter practice of every American lawyer.

We cannot understand the major cases of the Marshall Court, including Marbury, Martin, and McCulloch without this context. In these cases, litigants argued over, and the Court wrestled with, whether public or private legislation provided the best analogy for the Federal Constitution. The answer dictated whether restrictive or pragmatic rules would govern its interpretation. The terms of these arguments would have been obvious to the legal thinkers of that generation. Yet, in spite of all the attention we have lavished on Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Story, and their world, this central dynamic of their legal culture has remained unexplored.

This Article argues that, during framing and ratification, many of the Founders thought the Constitution would be interpreted according to the rules applicable to public legislation, although statesmen like Jefferson and Madison later took a different view. Chief Justice Marshall’s enduring commitment to the public-act analogy explains his embrace of “implied powers” in McCulloch and underpins the broad, nationalist vision in his other major decisions. These insights are not only critical to understanding those decisions on their own terms, they are also highly relevant to modern constitutional theorists who rely on early American precedent. If the Founders intended that the Constitution would be interpreted according to the rules of public legislation, then the “original” Constitution is a flexible and pragmatic charter, not a fixed and immutable artifact.

--Dan Ernst

Lakier on Freedom of Speech beyond the First Amendment

Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School, has posted The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, which is forthcoming in volume 134 of the Harvard Law Review:

The First Amendment dominates popular and scholarly debate about freedom of speech in the United States. Yet it is not the only legal instrument that protects expressive freedom, the rights of the institutional press, or the democratic values that these rights facilitate. A rich body of local, state, and federal laws also does so, and does so in ways the First Amendment does not. This Article explores the history, and the present-day operation of what it calls the non-First Amendment law of freedom of speech. Doing so changes our understanding of both the past and the present of the American free speech tradition. It reveals that the nineteenth century was not a period in which there was little legal protection for freedom of speech, as scholars have long assumed. It also makes evident that the contemporary system of free expression is much more majoritarian, and much more pluralist in its conception of what freedom of speech means and requires than the we commonly assume. Recognizing as much is important not only as a descriptive matter but as a doctrinal one. This is because in few other areas of constitutional law does the Court look more to history to guide its interpretation of the meaning of the right. And yet, the Court’s view of the relevant regulatory history is impoverished. Missing from the Court’s understanding of freedom of speech is almost any recognition of the important non-constitutional mechanisms that legislators have traditionally used to promote it. The result is a deeply inconsistent body of First Amendment law that relies on a false view of both our regulatory present, and our regulatory past — and, as a result, is able to proclaim a commitment to laissez faire principles that, in reality, it has never been able to sustain.

--Dan Ernst

Gerstle & Isaac, eds., "States of Exception in American History"

New from the University of Chicago Press: States of Exception in American History, edited by Gary Gerstle (University of Cambridge) and Joel Isaac (University of Chicago). A description from the Press:

States of Exception in American History brings to light the remarkable number of instances since the Founding in which the protections of the Constitution have been overridden, held in abeyance, or deliberately weakened for certain members of the polity. In the United States, derogations from the rule of law seem to have been a feature of—not a bug in—the constitutional system.

The first comprehensive account of the politics of exceptions and emergencies in the history of the United States, this book weaves together historical studies of moments and spaces of exception with conceptual analyses of emergency, the state of exception, sovereignty, and dictatorship. The Civil War, the Great Depression, and the Cold War figure prominently in the essays; so do Francis Lieber, Frederick Douglass, John Dewey, Clinton Rossiter, and others who explored whether it was possible for the United States to survive states of emergency without losing its democratic way. States of Exception combines political theory and the history of political thought with histories of race and political institutions. It is both inspired by and illuminating of the American experience with constitutional rule in the age of terror and Trump.

Some chapters that are especially likely to interest our readership:

2 Negotiating the Rule of Law: Dilemmas of Security and Liberty Revisited

Ewa Atanassow and Ira Katznelson

4 The American Law of Overruling Necessity: The Exceptional Origins of State Police Power

William J. Novak

5 To Save the Country: Reason and Necessity in Constitutional Emergencies

John Fabian Witt

6 Powers of War in Times of Peace: Emergency Powers in the United States after the End of the Civil War

Gregory P. Downs

9 Constitutional Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century American Political Thought

Joel Isaac

10 Frederick Douglass and Constitutional Emergency: An Homage to the Political Creativity of Abolitionist Activism

Mariah Zeisberg

 

More information is available here.

 

-- Karen Tani

Goldsworthy on History of British Constitutional Theory

Jeffrey Denys Goldsworthy, Monash University Faculty of Law, has posted A Brief History of Constitutional Theory in Britain, which is forthcoming in The Cambridge Constitutional History of the United Kingdom (Cambridge UP):

This paper surveys the development of constitutional theory in England, and later Britain, from the Twelfth Century until today. It shows how contending theories attempted to reconcile the need for strong central authority to maintain order and justice, with the need to control that authority - either through law or political struggle - to prevent its misuse. It describes a gradual transition from theories of monarchical rule to those of mixed government and finally parliamentary democracy, and how they understood the place or role of the Church, the law, “the community” and “the people”.

--Dan Ernst

Balkin on Lawyers, Historians, and the Constitution

Jack M. Balkin, Yale Law School, has posted Lawyers and Historians Argue About the Constitution, which is forthcoming in Constitutional Commentary 35 (2020):

Lawyers and historians often quarrel about how to use history in constitutional interpretation. Although originalists are often involved in these disputes today, the disagreements predate the rise of conservative originalism. Lawyers attempt to escape the criticism of historians through two standard stories that explain the differences between what lawyers and historians do.

According to the first story, lawyers employ specialized skills of legal exegesis that historians lack. According to the second, lawyers require a usable past that historians will not provide. These stories paint a false picture of how historical work is relevant to constitutional argument. And by emphasizing lawyers’ professional differences from historians, they disguise disagreements within the class of lawyers and legal advocates about how to use (and how not to use) history. When lawyers try to stiff-arm professional historians, often they are actually engaged in long-running disputes with other lawyers who disagree with their interpretive theories, their methods, and their conclusions.

To explain how lawyers and historians actually join issue, this article uses a familiar idea in constitutional theory—the modalities of constitutional argument. With respect to most of the modalities, historians are as well-equipped as lawyers. Indeed, many disputes between lawyers and historians do not concern the distinctive skills of lawyers at all, but rather controversial theories of interpretation that many lawyers do not accept either.

The more that lawyers try to assert the methodological autonomy of law from history, the more they will fail, ironically, because of law's distinctively adversarial culture. In order to win arguments, lawyers will search for ever new historical sources and approaches, and they will insist on bringing historians back in to undercut the claims of their opponents. Similarly, the claim that lawyers need a usable past fails because it employs history for too limited a purpose and treats too much of history as unusable. Rather, the best way for lawyers to obtain a usable past is to recognize the many modalities of historical argument, and the many different ways to use history in legal argument.

--Dan Ernst