The International City of Tangier

The flag of the International City of Tangier

At first glance, Tangier (طنجة) seems like an unremarkable seaside town, a stone throw away from the strategic strait of Gibraltar, connecting the Mediterranean to the Atlantic ocean. But this odd town has a disproportionately rich history. Founded by the Carthaginians in the early 5th century BC, ruled by Romans, Vandals, (Eastern) Roman again, Arab and the Portuguese. In fact, it was part of the dowry of Princess Catherine of Portugal to the recently crowned Charles II of England, transferring the settlement to English control in 1662. The English had planned to convert the town to their main naval base in the region (akin to Gibraltar but of course, the English only controlled Gibraltar in 1713) but abandoned & destroyed the town when it was besieged by the Moroccan Sultan in 1685. In the 19th century, Tangier became a hub of international diplomacy and politics. Amongst the curious notabilities in the town's history include it being the site of the USA's first consulate, being the focus on an international confrontation between the French and the Germans, and infamous for espionage during the Cold War.

A map of the International Zone

The year is 1912; Morocco has been divided between the Spanish and the French. France wants to incorporate Tangier into its Moroccan possessions, the Spanish likewise. The British, on the other hand, wanted nothing of the sort and advocated that the city and its hinterlands be declared an international zone with no prevailing foreign power. Disagreements continued and were interrupted by the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914.

The European dispute was resolved with the signing of the Tangier Protocol in 1923, which declared the city a 373-square-kilometre demilitarised international zone, to be co-administered by an international multi-tiered legislative body representing the UK, France and Spain. The treaty was mediated by the League of Nations and the city's native population was under the 'nominal sovereignty' of the Moroccan Sultan. Portugal, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States later joined to co-administrate the zone.

The full text of the Tangier protocol can be viewed here

For an intimate portrayal of life in the Tangier International Zone, I redirect you to this wonderful essay.

A scene in Tangier

Suffice to say that the native Moroccan population were not favourable to the foreign presence nor to the International Zone itself which they called "a plague zone infested and infected by infidels".

On 14 June 1940, the day Paris fell to the invading Germans during World War 2, the Spanish army occupied Tangier, incorporating it into its Moroccan possessions and assumed policing powers of the zone, calling it a 'wartime measure'. This drew international condemnation, particularly from the British government, worried about the Spanish entering the war on the side of the Nazis. The Spanish guaranteed rights of British subjects in the city and to not fortify the zone. In May 1944, German diplomats from the city were expelled. 
Following the end of World War 2, the Spanish withdrew from the city and the international zone was reinstated. 

The nine Western powers met in 1956 and agreed to abolish the zone and to secede it to the newly-independent Moroccan state (treaty text here). Pre-1956 Tangier had a population of 40,000 Muslims and 31,000 Europeans.

Further reading:

• Susan Gilson Miller (2013). A History of Modern Morocco. ISBN 9781139619110, pages 88-104
• Finlayson, Iain (1992). Tangier: City of the Dream. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00217857-5.

The Treaty that Outlawed Slavery in the Gulf

Officially known as the General Treaty for the Cessation of Plunder and Piracy by Land and Sea, this treaty was initially signed between the British government (represented by the British India government) and  the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman and Umm al-Quwain on the 11th of January 1820. Bahrain later signed the treaty in February. This treaty is significant due to the simple fact it effectively outlawed piracy and slavery in the Gulf, whilst also requiring seaworthy ships to be registered with the British.

This was part of a greater strategy employed by the British to exclude European powers (especially the ever-threatening Russian Empire) from exerting influence in the Middle East and disrupting communication lines with British-controlled India.

Thanks to the wonderful people at the Qatar Digital Library who have digitised more than 500,000 scans & documents from the archives of the India Office records and many more; we are able to see a transcript of the actual document signed below. Wikisource also has a transcribed copy.

Page 1, from the Qatar Digital Library

Page 2, from the Qatar Digital Library

• A Collection of Treaties and Engagements relating to the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in force up to the End of 1953' [‎19v] (40/92), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/738, in Qatar Digital Library <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023550810.0x000029> [accessed 27 June 2015]

A Prelude to the French Occupation of Tunisia

Tunisia entered the 19th century under the reign of Hammouda ibn Ali, the Bey of Tunis, as a minor Mediterranean power thanks to trade and extortion of European states through piracy (see the Barbary States), enjoying its quasi-independent autonomy from the Ottoman Porte in Constantinople. By the end of the 19th century, Tunisia fell in debt, the French achieved total economic control, the Bey signed a treaty with the French, stripping its sovereignty and placing the country under French protection whilst installing an appointed Resident-General from Paris to "advise" the Bey ( effectively a nominal ruler) and to oversee the country.

In this article, we shall delve into the details and events leading up to (and not after) the Treaty of Bardo, which solidified French control over the country.

The Treaty of Bardo

The French Maghreb:

Historically, Tunisia had ancient links with the European mainland. After all, the extinct Carthaginian civilisation originated here and along with it the Punic Wars with Rome. Just as those wars of ages past were about control over the Mediterranean, the story with Tunisia is remarkably familiar.

The French merchants of Marseille regularly traded goods to and from Tunisia, and it is no surprise the French made their first permanent presence in Tunis by establishing a consulate in 1577. During the height of the Age of Imperialism in the 18th century, the traditional influence of the French in Tunis was contested by the English, the Ottomans and the Italians. The French sought to assert their control through a series of concessional treaties, the most notable of which was signed in 1802 where the Bey formally acknowledged (to Napoleon) France's privileged position.

As France's economic power began to grew, the Bey's powers began to wane. His Turkish army corps had rebelled twice in 1811 and 1816, his naval forces suffered disastrously in 1827 after participating in the Battle of Navarino alongside the Ottomans (which he was obliged to do) during the Greek War of Independence. Outbreaks of plague in 1825 further weakened the Bey's economic capabilities. Weakened, the Bey had to sign a capitulation treaty in 1829 that allowed French citizens to only be tried by the French consul in Tunis.

Tunisia (dark blue) with the rest of French Africa (light blue)

French influence and power in the region grew greater after the 1830 invasion of Algeria. The French had numerous reasons to invade this autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire; raw materials, trading, establishment of settler colonies (but this is a topic for a different article). It is worth noting that the colonial policy to Algeria was greatly different than that of Tunisia. While Tunisia was to be a protectorate, Algeria was not to be a simple colony. It was a settler colony that officially became a part of France in 1848, where Republican workers and the unemployed from France would be shipped across the sea to their new homes, most of which were lands deprived from native Algerians.

The political fallout from the invasion of Algeria reached every capital throughout Europe. In Constantinople, the loss of Algiers was a blow to the already-declining Ottoman Empire. To the Germans, British and Italians, the French presence in Algeria presented a threat to their own imperial ambitions in the African continent and the Mediterranean and immediately began to seek ways to compensate (my previous post dealt with what the Italians did).

Within a month of the invasion, the Tunisians signed yet another treaty with the French, which opened the Tunisian market to French-manufactured goods, which undermined the country's traditional artisans and raised prices of local goods. The treaty also allowed European consuls to judge cases involving European citizens. As a result, European consuls were able to interfere in Tunisian domestic affairs.

Beys, Debts And A Constitution:

Ahmed Bey ruled Tunisia from 1837 to 1855 and it was under his rule that the beginning of the end had begun. When the benevolent Bey came to power, Tunisia's sovereignty was not only the target of French ambitions but of a newly-reinvigorated Ottoman Empire, eager to spread the Tanzimat (administrative restructuring and reform) that would strengthen the Sultan's control in the face of growing European powers. However, these reforms directly threatened the Bey's independence. The French, seeking to take advantage of the situation, offered to protect Tunisia from Ottoman and other European encroachment. Ahmed Bey declined, knowing what France's true intentions are.

Ahmed Bey

Ahmed Bey began a reform program of his own, which sought to expand and modernise the Tunisian professional army. By 1847, Ahmed Bey's army boasted 26,000 men. Under Ahmed Bey (and pressure from the British consulate), slavery was abolished and tax farms were created in the countryside to provide revenue for the state. While this new army was loyal to Tunis and not Constantinople, it did little to prevent the country's decline. Encouraged by a corrupt Mustafa Khaznader (Ahmed Bey's finance minister), Ahmed Bey embarked on a costly administrative and building program that plunged the country into debt. As a result of corrupt tax collectors, drought, cholera and plague outbreaks, agricultural and tax revenues declined heavily. Ahmed Bey had to personally finance the equipment and transport of 4000 soldiers to serve in the Crimean War for the Ottomans.

Mohammed Bey, Ahmed's successor, was more terrible. He overturned the abolition of slavery and administered his own arbitrary system of justice that was unfavourable to non-Tunisians, to the anger and frustration of European consuls. Concerned about the security and investment of their citizens, the British and French consuls pressured Mohammed Bey to accept reforms that provided greater security for foreigners. Adopted in September 1857, the Security Pact established legal equality between Tunisians and non-Tunisians, and gave Europeans the right to acquire property. These new freedoms, especially the new right to acquire property, made it easier for European interests to acquire a greater hold of the Tunisian economy.

This sparked calls by Tunisian intellectuals for the establishment of 'dustur' (دستور) or constitution which sought to create an institutionalised check on the Bey's power. Written in 1860, this was the Arab World's first constitution. In it, it confirmed the Bey as the hereditary head of state, it called for the establishment of a 60-member Supreme Council with substantial power that controls taxation and expenditure, whilst also having the ability to dismiss ministers.

The constitution only lasted for 4 years. The French and other European consuls did not like how it complicated their relationships with the Bey nor were they fond of the idea that their nationals would be subject to Tunisian law, which they argued violated previous treaties signed in the past. A flaw with the Supreme Council was that its members were directly appointed by the Bey himself. As a result, it did not live up to the expectations of Tunisian intellectuals. In 1864, the constitution was suspended and poll taxes were doubled to help pay the country's mounting debt. In response, Berber tribes and towns in the country's interior revolted. In 1866, the Tunisian government appealed to the Rothschild Banking House for 115 million francs to pay off the country's foreign debt. They refused.

Debts! Damn Debts And Conspiracies:

Poster inviting French people to immigrate to Tunisia (1890)

Tunisia's economic woes posed a conundrum to the European powers. On the one hand, France, Italy and Britain shared a common concern for their investments in the country (France particularly heavily invested in railroads, ports, mines and agriculture). Collapse of the Tunisian government and civil unrest was in none of their interests.

To avert the crisis, the International Financial Commission was established in 1869 to oversee Tunisia's budget. The Commission effectively controlled all state expenditure and organised the repayment of debts. On the other hand, the European powers distrusted each other; though France had the most economic presence in Tunisia, the Italians had the largest population residing there. The British primarily focused their attention on Egypt. Tunisia was seen by Paris as an important buffer between the East and Algeria, and its status needed to be determined decisively.

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Britain, France and Germany tried to reach an agreement. The German representative, the influential Otto von Bismarck suggested that France's interest in Tunisia should be recognised by both Germany and Britain. They pledged not to intervene in the event of a French claim or occupation of Tunisia. In return, Britain expected that the French would recognise Cyprus as British territory in the Eastern Mediterranean. Bismarck anticipated French resources and attention to be diverted to Africa, away from Europe. Once all this was agreed, they followed common diplomatic protocol and kept it a secret from the Ottomans, because this was basically the equivalent of carving up their empire.

Congress of Berlin, 1878

The French were wary of intervening in another North African state. The previous invasion of Algeria in 1830 resulted in successive rebellions that took four decades to quell, the last of which occurred seven years before the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The French primarily wanted Tunisia to serve as a buffer between French Algeria and Italian Cyrenaica (Libya). So as long as no trouble was caused in Algeria from Tunisia, Paris did not want to risk another costly military campaign and occupation.

By 1880, France controlled the railway and telegraph lines of Tunisia, established a low-interest bank to aid and encourage the growth of French agriculture and industry, invested in a new port in Tunis and in several mines in the countryside. With such heavy investments, it became impossible for the French not to be involved in domestic Tunisian economic and political issues. In the meantime, smuggling and drought made the International Financial Commission's job of paying government bonds harder. The French began to realise that protecting French investments would require more direct involvement.

In 1880, the French consul in Tunis, Adolphe-Francois de Botmilau commented:

"A last attempt is made in this moment to save this country by the financial commission. If it fails, we would have to be forcibly called upon to occupy Tunisia and this will be a troublesome extremity for us"

Page 1 of the Treaty of Bardo

Ignoring the economic aspect, the Italians were another problem. Despite the large Italian population in Tunisia and their contribution to the country, Italy was excluded from the Congress of Berlin. Italian attempts at obtaining land, such as the purchase of railway lines, caused out-roar amongst French colonialists.

But it was neither colonial nor economic hardship that eventually provoked a French occupation of Tunisia. According to the official narration, Khroumour tribesmen from Tunisia engaged in cross-border raids into French Algeria in March 1881. They were repelled by a joint Algerian-French force and felt that they had to cross into Tunisia.

Using this as an excuse, the French army of 36,000-strong occupied Bizerte, and soon turned south towards Tunis. Britain and Germany stood-by, as previously agreed in Berlin.. On 12 May 1881, the Bey signed the Treaty of Bardo, which gave France substantial control over Tunisia and placing the country under French protection where it remained until it achieved independence in 1956..

References:

• Christopher Alexander (2010). Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb. London: Routledge . p13-21.
• Assa Okoth (2006). A History of Africa: African societies and the establishment of colonial rule, 1800-1915. East African Publishers. p297-302
• Roslind Varghese Brown, Michael Spilling (2008). Tunisia. Marshall Cavendish. p21-36

Una Fatalia Storica - The Italian invasion of Libya

The Derna, a cargo ship, departed from Turkey in September 1911. Its cargo hold was filled with 20,000 rifles, 2 million rounds of ammunition and machineguns, destined to the Ottoman-Libyan port of Tripoli and to be distributed amongst loyal Libyan tribesmen. On 24 September, Italy caught wind of the ship’s journey and issued a warning to the Ottomans that “sending war materials to Tripoli was an obvious threat to the status quo” and endangered the Italian community in Libya. The ship started unloading its cargo at Tripoli harbor on the 26^th of September. Infuriated, the Italian government issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Ottoman empire on the 28^th: the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are to fall under Italian jurisdiction and military occupation or else war would be declared. 

The Ottomans gave a reasonable and conciliatory reply but Italy would have none of it. On the 29^th of September, Italy declared war on Ottoman Libya, a decision described by the Italian prime minister Giovanni Giolitti as fulfilling una fatalia storica – a history destiny.

The Ottoman-Italian war (photo from Commons)

Prelude

 

But why Libya? At the time, Libya (formally called the vilayat of Tripolitania) was a neglected region in the Ottoman empire. It had neither roads nor railways, and produced (in the terms of a contemporary European writer) “products of primitive husbandry” such as livestock and dates. The farming industry barely managed to produce food to feed the whole population. What reasons did the Italians have to be in Libya?

To answer this question, we must go back to the time when Italy was born without Rome nor Venice, in August 1863. The Opinione paper of Turin had warned that 

“If Egypt and with it the Suez Canal falls to the British, and if Tunis falls to the French and if Austria expands into Albania, we will soon find ourselves without breathing space in the dead centre of the Mediterranean. “

The Italian colonial empire, by 1940.

Even earlier, in 1838, Giuseppe Mazzini, who helped unify Italy, declared that North Africa belongs to Italy. In the 19^th century, Italy was a relatively new & poor country that was seemingly surrounded by Great Powers on all three sides; the French, the Austrian Empire, the Ottomans and the British. Determined to become a Great Power in her own right, in the 1860s and 1870s, Italy began to court Tunisia, Rome’s first African colony and then still an Ottoman province. With a large Italian population of 25,000 by 1881, it seemed that Tunisia would be easy-picking for Italy. Unfortunately, the Bey (governor) of Tunisia accepted French rule in May 1881, dealing a blow to Italian pride and sending the country’s politicians panicking. 

France’s interference in Tunisia inadvertedly lead to Italy entering the Scramble For Africa, acquiring the unpromising but strategic regions of Somalia and Eritrea in 1889. Italy soon set its eyes on Ottoman Libya, compensation in their view for Tunisia. Control of Libya provided strategic access over the central Mediterranean, and territory close to the lucrative Suez Canal trade. In Italy’s view, they had to claim Libya to counter French (or others) influence in the Mediterranean. Mussolini later commented,

“For others, the Mediterranean is just a route. For us, it is life itself.”

From the 1880s until 1911, Italy pursued a vague policy of “peaceful penetration”; establishing Italian schools, encouraging the migration of Italian farmers in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), setting up of Italian banks and funding mineral prospecting expeditions. The Italian public was largely supportive of the movement; as far back as 1889, Italian nationalists, industrialists and the Catholic Church had called for the colonial expansion, arguing that it would combat Italy’s alleged overpopulation and mass emigration to the United States. 

“To emigrate is servile,' Italians were told, 'but to conquer colonies is a worthy task for a free and noble people”

Nationalist newspapers depicted Libya as a good source of grains and olives as well as possessing lucrative trade routes.  Italian explorers ventured to Libya, calling it Italy’s Fourth Shore, and described the potential wealth of the unexploited countryside and the seemingly endless green fields of Cyrenaica (in 1911, a writer went as far as to say that 1/4^th of the country could be cultivated using irrigation).

But why not simply invade? Why go through this decades-long process? The reason was that the Italians feared an invasion of Ottoman Libya would result in a greater European war, with perhaps the Austrians making unacceptable gains in the Balkans, and potential backlash with France or other European powers. As a result, the Italian diplomatic goal was to secure assurances and guarantees from Europe’s powers. In the 1900s, Italy acquired assurances from Britain, Austria & Germany (both being Allies), Russia and the United States. Year after year, the Italians waited for their opportunity to strike. In 1911, in the aftermath of the Agadiz crisis that saw France gain even more territory in North Africa, Italy decided to act, scheduling an invasion in the autumn, when the sea was calmest. 

Italy needed a casus belli and it found one. In 1908, two Italians (one of them a priest) were murdered in Tripoli, and the Ottoman investigation proved inconclusive. The Italian media hunched onto the story, claiming that Italian lives and property were in danger in Libya and campaigned furiously for an occupation. With the backing of the majority of the public (minus the Socialists, who rioted against the idea of an “imperialist invasion”, interestingly enough Mussolini was amongst the rioters and was jailed for his criticism of the invasion) and the Catholic Church (who praised the “crusading spirits” of the masses) , the invasion seemed in place. 

War & Peace:

Italian landing at Tripoli, October 1911

After the Dernaincident, four Italian battleships disembarked from Italy on the 1^stof October and anchored the next day outside of Tripoli. It was only at 3:15pm on the 3^rd of October that the ships began bombarding the three Ottoman forts of Tripoli. On the 5^th , 900 marines landed and captured the badly-damaged forts. The Turkish commander and his depleted garrison, seeking to spare the city from bombardment, withdrew from the city. By nightfall, around 1,700 more marines occupied the town of Tripoli. The Ottoman garrison, numbering less than 5,000, regrouped with Libyan tribesmen inland whilst the Italian vanguard awaited the arrival of the main expeditionary force, which arrived a week later.  

 

The Italian fleet, off the coast of Tobruk, in October 1911

Italy had hoped the Turks would seek negotiations after the capture of Tripoli but they had no intention to. The Italians were surprised to face stiff resistance from the native Libyans whom they thought would welcome them as liberators. East of Tripoli, the Italians were almost overwhelmed by a combined Libyan-Turkish assault at Henni on the 23^rd of October. Meanwhile in Cyrenaica, Italian amphibious landings and shelling resulted in the capture of Tobruk, Derna and Homs on the 4^th, 18^th and 21^st of October.

 On 18 October, another Italian battle fleet (consisting of 7 battle cruisers and 20 transport ships) anchored outside Benghazi and issued a 24-hour ultimatum, demanding the town’s surrender. The 280-man garrison defended the town against hopeless odds. After the ultimatum expired, the fleet shelled the city to the ground, destroying the city’s Grand Mosque and damaging the Franciscan mission as well as the British and Italian consulates, all of which were packed with refugees. Later that day, the Turkish garrison surrendered, but the Italian occupiers faced unexpected resistance from the inhabitants of the suburbs. The Turko-Libyan forces withdrew from the town in the next few days.

Italian battery bombardment of Benghazi

By the end of October 1911, Italy controlled five beachheads on the Libyan coast and had deployed 34,000 men, 6,300 horses,  1,050 wagons, 145 warships amongst others. The war was the first to see the deployment of new technologies such as machineguns, radio-telegraph and motor-transport as well as aeroplanes in battle. 

The town of Tripoli rioted against the Italians at the end of October but was brutally suppressed. On 5 November 1911, the Italian King Victor Emmanuel issued a royal decree, bringing Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the Italian Crown. In what is comparable to George Bush’s premature “Mission Accomplished” declaration in 2003, so too was King Victor’s. It would take twenty years before Libyan resistance was effectively subdued. 

The invasion was a disaster primarily because it failed to account for the actions of the native Libyan population. The Italians had hoped the Libyans would welcome them as saviours from the corrupt Turks or at the very least to stay neutral in the war. However, the Italians failed to recognize that the Libyans and the Ottomans were bound in religion. Both people were Muslim and to the Libyans, they were fighting against an invading Christian army akin to the Crusaders. This blunder lead to the war being dragged out for a year, much to the relief of the Turks who were also surprised by the support they were given.

 Due to Italian naval supremacy and Britain’s reluctance to allow Ottoman troops to march through Egypt, reinforcements could not be directly sent. However, colonels and generals (such as a young Mustafa Kemal) smuggled their way through Egypt into Libya. Arms were smuggled from Greece and French Tunisia also.  The influential Sanussi tribesmen of Cyrenaica’s desert rallied armies in support of the Ottomans, though with poorly armed weaponry. 

A young Mustafa Kamel, in Derna (1912)

In 1912, a stalemate was reached. The Italians in Tripoli had managed to extend their radius of control by a few miles, the port of Misrata was captured in February. Italian troops were deployed to the Tunisian frontier to cease the arms smuggling. After 11 months, none of the five beach-heads had linked up. The Italian army dugged in in Derna were besieged by a 10,000-man irregular army.  

 

The signing of the treaty of Lausanne

The war was demoralizing for Italy (who expected it to be a walk-in-the-park) but worse for the Turks, who faced unrest in the Balkans and other regions.

 In July 1912, the Turks and Italians quietly met in Lausanne on the shores of Lake Geneva. It was only on 17 October 1912 that both parties declared peace, much to the surprise of Libyans who felt betrayed.  The treaty they signed was vague; the Ottoman Sultan was to declare Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as independent and that Libyans were now Italian subjects. In return, the Italians withdrew from the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea. The Sultan also retained the power to appoint the grand religious cleric of Tripoli, allowing the Ottomans to retain religious control over the region. 

For the Italians, it was a cheap and fairly easy victory. The Ottomans could not afford to continue the war. However, Libyan irregulars continued to fight on. With the Italians only in control of the coastal settlements, Libya’s interior remained hostile tribal territory. To the Ottomans, their fight ended. To the Libyans, their fight has just begun.

References:

• A History of Libya by John Wright, pages 101-114.

• The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, pages 104-105
• Photos from Wikimedia Commons

Writer's note: This post was originally written for itshistorypodcasts.com and published on 6 August 2013 (viewable here).

The World's First Airstrike

Gavotti aboard Farman biplane, Rome 1910

In April 2011, Italy had announced it would join NATO's air attacks in Libya, then in the middle of its civil war. It would later prove a classical case of history repeating itself.

A century ago, in September 1911, the Italian armed forces invaded Ottoman-held Libya with the intent of establishing an Italian colonial empire, something that Italy lacked whilst its French and German neighbors prided upon. This led to the Italo-Turkish war which dragged on until October 1912, with the Italians winning control of Libya, having subdued Turkish and Libyan resistance.

Insignificant as this war may seem to us, the Italian Turkish war saw numerous technological advancements deployed in battle. One of them, most notable, being aeroplanes.

This brings us to the story of a young Italian aviator, lieutenant Giulio Gavotti, who was deployed to Libya to oversee the transport of aeroplanes. But within a few months, Gavotti had done what no man had done before in warfare. Gavotti was the world's first air-bomber, only eight years after the monumental flight of the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.

On the first of November 1911, Gavotti boarded his Etrich Taube aeroplane and took with him four grenades, weighing a kilo and a half each. Gavotti took off and headed for Ain Zara. It is now a town just east of Tripoli, but at the time he described it as a small oasis. There he would have expected to find Arab fighters and Turkish troops that were allied in the fight against the Italian invasion.

The type of plane used in the airstrike, the Etrich Taube

Flying at an altitude of 600 feet, Gavotti screwed in the detonators and tossed each grenade over the side of the plane. Whilst unknown, Gavotti's mission is believed to have been a failure, having failed to cause any reported casualties.

Back home in Italy, the Italian press was ecstatic, with many newspapers reporting the exploit in high regards, to strengthen support for the war at home. Gavotti had shown it was possible to use aeroplanes to aid warfare (a contrast to the Wright Brothers' opinion that aeroplanes were "tools of peace".) and may have inadvertedly paved the way for the horrors of Dresden, Hiroshima and countless others to occur.

Zepplin bombing, during the Italian Turkish War, 1911.

Trivia:

Future dictator of Italy, Benito Mussolini (then a left-wing socialist), was vehemently opposed to the Italian-Turkish War.

 Update: The BBC provides an excellent article on the attack, with the usage of primary sources from Gavotti himself.

A Brief History of the Great Syrian Revolt (1925-1927)

Foreword: This is just a brief outline of the Great Syrian Revolt (sometimes termed as The Great Druze Revolt) so there are bound to be stuff missing, since this is a summary!

Military band marking the proclamation of Faisal as the King of Syria

As you might already know, after the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was divided between France and the United Kingdom. UK got Iraq, Jordan and the Palestine region while France got the Levantine region, consisting of Lebanon and Syria.

So why the revolt?

Now, the problem was that the Arabs fought on the British side during The Great War and wanted to establish their own state in the region of Syria (and beyond). So, in March 1920 (under King Faisal of the Hashemites), the Kingdom of Syria was proclaimed. The French were not amused and 4 months later, the Kingdom of Syria fell when the French invaded and occupied Damascus.

The years that followed 1920 were hardly peaceful, bastions of resistance towards the French sprung up across the country but they lacked centrality or unity. It was usually a single ethnic group with limited coordination with other factions. Alawites, Druze, Bedouins, Sunnis all individually attempted to revolt against the French in the following five years after 1920. Though the French had control of the urban areas (with the aid of the social elite) of Damascus, Aleppo and others, very little evidence of a French presence existed in the villages.

Damascus in flames, circa 1925.

In 1925, another open revolt emerged in Syria. What makes this one different from previous attempts was the presence of multiple factions (Alawites, Druze, Sunnis etc.) in a de-facto alliance. I use "de-facto" because, like previous revolts, no centrally-coordination was present.

The revolt was initiated by the Druze leader and Syrian nationalist Sultan al-Atrash issuing a call to arms and resistance against the French. The revolt was successful in its initial stages and lead to the capture of Druze-majority cities in the south of Syria (see here), owing to the minimal presence of French soldiers (there were 14,397 soldiers in Syria in 1925, compared to 70,000 in 1920). The French countered this by deploying thousands of soldiers from its colonies, with weapons superior to those of the Syrian rebels.

Sultan al-Atrash and soldiers at Hauran

The revolt was not put down until the spring of 1927, after the French had retaken all the major cities of Syria. The uprising led to the French government to conclude that direct rule over Syria was too costly, owing to the transport and supply of soldiers. A year after the uprising, France declared an amnesty to the Syrian rebels but proclaimed that Sultan al-Atrash and other leaders of the rebellion would be exiled.

This was not a problem.The French sentenced Sultan al-Atrash and other national leaders to death, but al-Atrash escaped with the rebels to Transjordan and was eventually pardoned. In 1937, after the signing of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, he returned to Syria where he was met with a huge public reception.

Alfonso de Albuquerque: History Figure of the Month (July 2012)

A portrait of Alfonso de Albuquerque

So after going through the nominations in the previous History Figure post, the choice for this month is the Portuguese military genius, Alfonso de Albuqueque. Be sure to nominate a history figure for August 2012 in the comment section below!

Alfonso de Albuquerque (b.1453-1515) was a Portuguese admiral, and a strategy genius, credited with founding the Portuguese colonial empire in the Indian Ocean, with conquests in the Persian Gulf (in fact, it was a later-commanding colleague of Alfonso who conquered Bahrain from the Arabs) , India, the Red Sea and the Malay peninsula.

He also planned and built a series of strategically-placed forts around the Indian Ocean, to prevent access to the ocean from the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Pacific Ocean.

Early conquests: India, the Omani coast and the Persian Gulf

Alfonso's first oversea trip in the service of the Portuguese crown was in 1503, when he and his cousin led an armada to the Indian west coast, defeating the native forces in Calicut (present-day Kozhikode) and establishing a puppet kingdom at Cohin (present-day Kochi). It was during this mission that Alfonso, with the permission of the Portuguese king, built a fort at Cohin (the first of many). This was the basis of the Portuguese colonial empire.

Fort of Our Lady of the Conception (One of the last Portuguese relics in the Gulf)

In 1506, he was ordered to command a fleet of five vessels and to conquer the strategic island of Socotra, located at the mouth of the Red Sea which connects to the Indian Ocean. The idea was that a fortress would be constructed on the island and that trading from the Red Sea would cease. From Socotra, and with an army of 500 men and 7 ships, Alfonso launched an offensive along the Omani coast towards the commercial hub of the Persian Gulf, the island of Hormuz (after which the strait is named).

In July 1507, the cities of Curiati (present-day Muscat), Kalhat and Sohar fell to the Portuguese. By September, Alfonso's army reached Hormuz island and despite being outnumbered (400 men to an estimated 20,000), he managed to capture the city and establish it as a tributary state to the Portuguese King. He immediately proceeded to building a fort, called the ''Fort of Our Lady of the Conception'', hoping to control the sea-trade of Europe and the Ottoman empire via the Gulf. A mutiny of some of his officers and crewmen occurred in the next few months. Faced with low supplies and a two-ship army, he abandoned Hormuz in January 1508 and left for Socotra.

India, Malacca and the Red Sea:

When the Portuguese governor (or viceroy) of India heard of Alfonso's conquests when he arrived, he disavowed his conquests and refused to yield his power to him (the King had earlier appointed Alfonso as the new Portuguese governor since the current one's term was to end), it took an official letter from the King to convince the viceroy that Alfonso was his successor.

Alfonso, now the effective governor of Portuguese India, set about expanding the territory by conquering Goa, the most important trading post on the Malabar coast. He used political treachery and force to accomplish his ends, and wherever possible, employed a divide and conquer strategy against the Deccan sultanates and their Arab allies. Goa was set to be the primary trading port of Portuguese India.

Map of Portuguese possessions.

In 1511, Alfonso, with an army of 1,100 men and 18 ships, embarked on a voyage to Malacca, then the most important and richest trading post in the Spice Islands. He conquered the region and sacked the city, building another fortress to block trade from the Pacific ocean through the Strait of Malacca. Fresh from his victories in Malacca, he put down a rebellion in Goa, and built more forts in the region.

Portugal now controlled the principal strategic points from the east coast of Africa to Malacca, with the exception of the Red Sea. A system of licenses (called cartazas) required all ships to prove that they had paid customs duties at Malacca, Goa, or Hormuz. An unlicensed ship, particularly if it belonged to Moslems, was subjected to seizure and sinking. Albuquerque's policies thus had made the Portuguese the predominant, although not the only, commercial force in the East until the 17th century

In 1513, Alfonso prepared another army of 1,400 men to capture the city of Aden (in Yemen), which offered another strategic location near the Red Sea. After a fierce two-day battle in Aden, Alfonso's army was expelled from the city. Alfonso decided to sail up the Red Sea and capture the coastal town of Jeddah, but the winds were unfavourable and he had to withdraw.

Hormuz again and Death:

Portuguese map of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf

Alfonso built close relations with the Safavid Shah Ismail I, with the two being united in their rivalry against the Mamluks. In March1515, the Shah had offered Alfonso rich rewards if he had subdued and conquered Hormuz from a king under the influence of a renegade vizier. Alfonso had the vizier assassinated and Hormuz became a client state of the Portuguese Empire. Hormuz would not be Persian territory for another century until a combined Anglo-Persian force expelled the Portuguese in 1622.

It was in 1521, that a fellow colleague of Alfonso, António Correia, invaded Bahrain after the local ruler refused to pay tribute (in pearls) to the Portuguese. A battle was fought in present-day Karbabad between the forces. The Portuguese conquered the island and built another fort, the Portuguese fort. Their control would last for 80 more years.

For someone with an illustrious career, his life ended on a bitter note. By this time his political enemies in Portugal had planned his demise. They convinced the king of Portugal to relieve him of his duties. Alfonso was shocked and dismayed by this treacherous cowardice, and was too old to recover from this blow. He voiced his bitterness: "I am in ill favor with the king for love of men, and with men for love of the king." He died at sea on December 16, 1515, after writing a long letter assuring the king of his loyalty